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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper examines the relationship between bank diversity and SME firm 
innovation in China to evaluate the impact of recent bank deregulation.  
Design/methodology/approach – Using a large data set that includes 8143 firm-year 
observations of 1122 listed SME firms in China and baseline and robustness regression 
analyses, we identify how bank diversity affects firm innovation and via what economic 
mechanisms. Potential endogeneity problems are considered and addressed in the design and 
analysis to minimize research bias.   
Findings – We find robust evidence that bank diversity improves firm innovation. Specifically, 
the findings suggest that the positive effects of bank diversity on firm innovation are only 
significant for the firms which are more external finance dependent, have fewer growth 
opportunities and/or located in the provinces having low financial market development.  
Originality/value – This study provides novel evidence and insights into the relationship 
between banking market structure and the determinants of firm innovation in the Chinese 
context, as a result of China’s banking deregulation.   
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Introduction  
 
 
As bank loans are a vital source of external financing for firms to survive and compete, prior 
studies on the bank-firm relationship heavily focus on the availability of finance provided by 
banks and on firms’ financial constraints, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs; e.g. Ryan et al. 2014). In recent years, rapid development in new technologies has 
driven more and more firms’ innovation ventures, and these innovative firms face more 
financial constraints by the nature of uncertainty, risk and information opacity associated with 
innovative projects. As such, a growing literature pays attention to how bank market structure 
reform and deregulation can help firms’ innovation; however, the empirical evidence is not 
conclusive (Tian et al., 2019). To take some well-cited studies as examples (Chava et al., 2013; 
Amore et al. 2013; Cornaggia et al., 2015; Berger et al., 2019; Deng et al. 2018), all were 
conducted in the US, and the results generally favour the notion that improved bank market 
competition, the resulting increase in credit supply and decrease in finance cost can help 
enhance firm innovation.  
 
Specifically, relevant studies in the US context concentrate on investigating the impacts of 
intrastate and interstate banking deregulation between the 1970s and 1990s on economic 
growth and firms’ innovation, and provide either echoed or contrasting empirical evidence from 
each other. For example, the results from Chava et al. (2013) suggest that intrastate and 
interstate banking deregulation can play opposite roles in local banks’ market power and the 
level and risk of young and private firms involving in innovation, with the former (intrastate) 
increasing the local bank market power and decreasing the level and risk of innovation by 
young and private firms, while the latter (interstate) doing the opposite. They argue that these 
contrasting impacts of banking deregulation on firm innovation could translate into contrasting 
influences on economic growth. Amore et al. (2013) examine how staggered interstate banking 
deregulation could benefit manufacturing firms’ innovative performance. They find significant 
benefits in terms of quantity and quality of firms’ innovation activities, with performance 
particularly strong for firms highly dependent on external finance. They also emphasise that 
the results are largely attributed to geographical banking diversity and a well-functioning 
financial system. Cornaggia et al. (2015) explore whether the deregulation of interstate bank 
branching laws affects firm innovation through the changes in bank competition positions. 
Their findings confirm that bank competition helps small and innovative firms improve 
financial status and avoid being acquired by large and public firms. Also investigating the 
impact of staggered interstate bank deregulation, Deng et al. (2018) find bank geographic 
diversity can boost firms’ innovation investments and outputs through testing for causality 
between bank geographic diversity and firms’ innovation. The study of Berger et al. (2019) is 
conducted from a slightly different perspective. They analyze how bank deregulation 
influences the growth of financially unconstrained and constrained firms and, in turn, national 
economic growth. Their results prove that the deregulation is more beneficial to financially 
unconstrained firms than constrained firms, thus raising concerns for policy improvement. In 
a very recent paper, Tian et al. (2019) explore the relationship between bank competition and 
firm innovation efficiencies based on bank structure data between 1992 and 2010 and conclude 
that increased bank competition can improve firm innovation efficiencies.  
 
The empirical evidence from the above-mentioned studies reveals that the effects of banking 
market power changes, bank diversity and deregulation on firm innovation can be complex and 
mixed. One can see that even in the US context, interstate or intrastate deregulation can lead to 
opposite results (Amore et al., 2013), let alone in other countries which may have disparate 
bank market structures, financial systems and institutional settings. For instance, the US bank 
deregulation set up by individual state governments follows a staggered approach which 
includes intrastate deregulation, allowing banks to set up state-wide branches, and interstate 
deregulation, encouraging mergers and acquisitions (M&A) across states via bank holding 
companies (BHCs). The evidence suggests these two types of deregulation produce different 
economic impacts (Chava et al., 2013; Berger et al., 2019). However, for countries like China, 
transforming from a socialist centrally planned economy to a socialist market-oriented 
economic system, the banking deregulation might have a significantly different character to 
that in the US. To be specific, Chinese banking sector reform develops from a monopolistic 
state-owned banking system prior to 1978, then later a state-dominated two-tiered banking 
system, to nowadays (after banking system reforms from 2003) a market-oriented banking 
system with diversity in terms of ownership, types, functions, geographical coverage, lending 
infrastructure and technologies. With regards to the formal banking market, apart from the 
operation of five state-owned commercial banks (Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, 
China Construction Bank, Industry and Commercial Bank of China, and Bank of 
Communication ), other types of banks and financial institutions which can currently provide 
loans to firms include city commercial banks, rural credit cooperatives, rural cooperative banks, 
rural commercial banks, postal savings banks, village and township banks, loan companies, 
rural mutual cooperatives, and foreign banks. All of these banks, regardless of ownerships, 
sizes and geographical locations, are monitored and regulated by the People’s Bank of China 
(PBC) and the former China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC, since April 2018 the 
China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission -CBIRC) (Berger et al., 2009) and no 
M&A activities are allowed across different ownerships.  
 
It is noted that the literature in relation to bank finance and firm innovation as a result of 
changes in bank market power, diversity and deregulation is well documented in the US; 
however, little is known in other contexts, including in China. As discussed, China has had an 
interesting and unique recent history of banking reform and deregulation. This paper therefore 
aims to fill this gap by examining the relationship between bank diversity and firm innovation, 
because in China banking deregulation is mainly reflected in the diversity of bank types and 
the decentralization of the banking market. We focus on innovation in small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs; to simplify, we use ‘firms’ hereafter) as they are the most vulnerable and 
financially constrained group in receiving bank finance due to their smaller size and private 
ownership (Wu et al., 2018). Guariglia and Liu (2014) investigate to what extent financial 
constraints affect firm innovation activities using a sample of over 120,000 unlisted Chinese 
firms over the period 2000-2007, and their findings report that private firms suffer the most 
from financial constraints on their innovation activities. Arguably, Guariglia and Liu’s study 
does not cover bank deregulation and was conducted in earlier years which might be unable to 
capture the full influence of bank deregulation on firm innovation. Serious banking reform and 
deregulation in China only started after CBRC was established in 2003, and the effects of the 
diversity and deregulation on firm’s innovation would be expected to lag.  
 
To achieve our research objective, this paper investigates the impact of bank diversity on firms’ 
innovation outputs using province-level data to measure regional bank diversity. We collect 
data from firms in the SME Board and the growth enterprise market (GEM) of China covering 
the period 2007-2017. We find robust evidence that an increase in bank diversity leads to an 
increase in firms’ innovation outputs, supporting by the findings that the firms in the most 
diversified province (95th percentile in the distribution of bank diversity) have a total of 18.5% 
more patent applications than the firms in the least diversified province (5th percentile in the 
distribution). When we use granted patents as a proxy for firm innovation, the result is similar: 
the firms in the most diversified province (95th percentile in the distribution of bank diversity) 
have 17.6% more patents eventually granted than the firms in the least diversified province (5th 
percentile in the distribution). 
 
After confirming a positive relationship between bank diversity and firm innovation, we further 
examine three possible mechanisms (external finance dependence, firms’ growth opportunities 
and regional financial development) through which bank diversity converts firms’ innovation 
performance. The choice of these three channels, that can be possibly used to explain how and 
why bank competition, diversity and deregulation influence firm innovation, are supported by 
the aforementioned studies. With respect to the first channel, external finance dependence is 
one of the measures in Cornaggia et al. (2015), originally developed by Duchin et al. (2010). 
We use the same measure to test whether external finance dependence affects the scale of firm 
innovation outputs by responding to the changes in provincial-level bank diversity first. We 
presume that bank diversity reduces firm financing constraints mainly for external-finance-
dependent firms. Therefore, these firms should experience an increase in innovation outputs 
with bank diversity. We find external-finance-dependent firms located in the most diversified 
provinces (95th percentile in the distribution of bank diversity) have a total of 29.8% more loan 
applications and 28.1% more eventually granted patents than that of the firms in the least 
diversified province (5th percentile in the distribution). In contrast, we observe no effect of 
bank diversity on firms with below-median dependence on external finance. 
  
Second, firms’ growth opportunities provide another way to test how their needs for credit 
finance interact with the changes in bank diversity (Ryan et al., 2014). As bank diversity 
increases, we expect the innovation output of the firms with more growth opportunities to react 
differently compared to firms with fewer growth opportunities. We expect that high bank 
diversity would encourage firms borrowing more from banks to invest in innovation because 
credit availability is high. On the other hand, if a firm showing potential growth, banks might 
value more on the future prosperity of the innovative projects rather than on possible risks 
associated (Sharpe, 1990). Therefore, the innovation output of firms with more growth 
opportunities should be less influenced by bank diversity. Interestingly, our test reveals that the 
impact of bank diversity on innovative outputs is only observed in the firms with fewer growth 
opportunities and not those with more growth opportunities.   
 
Third, we test the impact of regional financial development on the relationship between bank 
diversity and firm innovation. It is difficult for firms to finance innovation because of the 
uncertainty and information asymmetry associated with innovative activities (Acharya and Xu, 
2017). However, in a cross-country study with a large data set covering 32 developed and 
emerging countries, Hsu et al. (2014) find that financial market development should help 
reduce the problems caused by information asymmetry from innovation activities because well-
functioning financial markets can effectively reduce financing costs, allocate resources, 
evaluate projects, manage risk, and even monitor managers. We, therefore, consider that 
innovative firms in the provinces with a high level of financial market development should be 
less influenced by bank market structure and diversity as they could get an alternative external 
finance source. We find the overall positive effects of bank diversity on innovation are 
particularly strong among firms established in the provinces with a low level of financial 
market development, proving that firm innovation is weakly affected by bank diversity in the 
provinces with a high level of financial market development. 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background. 
Section 3 describes the data and variable construction. Sections 4 and 5 present the baseline 
results and robustness checks respectively. Section 6 tests and discusses the possible 
mechanisms of our baseline results and Section 7 concludes the study. 
 Theoretical background 
Banking market structure determines the competition extent in the market, and strategic choice 
(Zineldin, 1996). The extant literature has discussed the relationship between banking market 
structure and firm financial constraints and formed two contrasting theoretical views. On the 
one hand, market power theory (Klein, 1971) suggests that in a concentrated and less 
diversified bank market, both competition and market efficiency are low, which can cause 
banks to supply fewer loans to firms at higher interest rates (Beck et al., 2004; Degryse and 
Ongena, 2005). As such, bank diversity is conducive to increasing bank competition and 
became a popular policy in the banking reform and deregulation implemented by governments 
in different countries, in order to improve the efficiency of the financial system (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997) and bank credit availability (Sturm and Williams, 2004). On the other hand, 
information theory (Petersen and Rajan, 1995) argues that a concentrated market would 
motivate banks to develop a long-lasting relationship with firms in order to overcome 
information asymmetry and reduce lending risks, as well as provide knowledge and advice to 
SMEs (Binks et al., 2006), which implies bank diversity may hinder the establishment of firm-
bank relationships and increase the financial constraints for firms’ innovative projects.  
 
Scholars comment that there are limitations for both the market power and information theories, 
as both focus on certain aspects while omitting others; some have called for the bank-firm 
relationship to be evaluated from a broader perspective to reflect a complicated phenomenon 
(e.g. Beck et al. 2004). We argue that these two theoretical views may contrast at a lower level, 
i.e. the relationship between banking market structure and firm financial constraints; but, 
however, they are more compatible at a higher level, i.e. the relationship between banking 
market structure and firm innovation, intermediated by bank diversity.    
 From the market power view, banks with market power are reluctant to provide credit to firms 
with innovations because innovative projects are normally associated with asymmetric 
information, high risk for failure and limited collateral value of intangible assets (Hsu et al., 
2014; Brown et al., 2017). Therefore, firms have no incentive to undertake innovative projects 
in a concentrated and less diversified bank market. However, once bank competition increases, 
banks’ behaviour on risk-taking could change accordingly. Compared with a concentrated 
market structure, banks in the more competitive and diversified market environment are less 
concerned about risk from innovative projects and are willing to take a high risk to keep their 
competitive position (Allen and Gale, 2004; Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005). On the other hand, 
from the information view, relationship-based banking in a concentrated market does not 
necessarily suggest that innovative firms are more easily financed by banks compared to other 
non-innovative firms (perhaps the opposite). This is because a concentrated bank market 
involves fewer banks with monopolistic power and limited expertise in evaluating innovative 
projects (Scherer, 2011; Atanassov, 2015). Meanwhile, innovative projects may take longer to 
succeed and require greater tolerance for experimentation and failure (Manso, 2011; Azoulay 
et al., 2011), and these banks might lack motivations to encourage clients (firms) to take risks 
on innovative projects as their relationship is already stable (Nakatani, 1984; Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003). In contrast, in a diversified bank market, there are more lenders from many 
different backgrounds to evaluate firms’ innovative projects, suggesting these innovative 
projects are more likely to be assessed accurately; conversely, firms have more choices in 
selecting banks as their innovative project creditors (Allen and Gale, 1999). In addition, a 
diversified bank system means firms’ innovative activities are less likely to be enforced 
substantial interventions by relationship banking (Gu et al., 2017). Finally, different types of 
banks may adopt different lending technologies and organizational structures (Beck et al., 2011) 
and these lending approaches would be tailored to serve for firm innovative project evaluation. 
In sum, a diversified banking market structure could encourage firms to pursue innovative 
projects. We, therefore, expect that bank diversity will positively affect firm innovative outputs. 
 
Data, variable measurement and summary of statistics 
Data  
We compile our data set from several databases. Following Dang and Motohashi (2015) and 
Fang et al. (2017), we collect patent data from the websites of the Chinese State Intellectual 
Property Office (CSIPO), and financial statements information from the China Stock Market 
& Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The website of CSIPO provides annual 
information on the number of patents, the types of patents, a patent’s application year, a patent’s 
grant year and patent renewal information. In order to obtain information about various types 
of financial institutions, we manually collect relevant information from Regional Financial 
Operation Reports published by the People’s Bank of China. Finally, similar to previous 
research (i.e., Zhou et al., 2017; Fang et al., 2017), we collect macroeconomic information from 
the China Statistical Yearbook issued by the National Bureau of Statistics of China in order to 
construct province-level control variables.  
 
In order to achieve our research objective, we choose firms in the SME Board and the GEM 
instead of the companies listed on the mainboard market of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. The SME Board and the GEM are set up by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which 
is regarded as the “NASDAQ” of China, to encourage SME independent innovation. Most of 
the firms in these two markets are SMEs with high needs of innovation and financing, and their 
asset sizes are much smaller than that in the mainboard market. The initial firm sample includes 
all listed firms in the SME Board and the GEM from 2007 to 2017. We then exclude the firm-
year observations with missing values. As our study focuses on the analysis of the financing 
issue in non-financial firms and the comparison of financial information, we exclude financial 
and utility firms to fit the purpose. In addition, we exclude Tibet province because there are 
some abnormal and missing values in their macroeconomic and financial institution 
information. The final sample consists of 8143 firm-year observations from 1122 listed firms. 
 
Measuring innovation 
Following existing literature (e.g. Hsu et al., 2014; Cornaggia et al., 2015; Tian and Han, 2019), 
we measure corporate innovation by patent-metrics. Based on the information available on the 
website of CSIPO, we construct two measures for firm-years innovation output. The first 
measure is the company’s number of patent applications (APPLY). Although it is 
straightforward to compute, this measure cannot identify effective and successful innovative 
activities. To further assess innovation performance, we construct a second measure of 
company innovation output by counting a company’s number of patents that are eventually 
granted by CSIPO (GRANT).  
 
In the baseline analysis, our tests are based on firm-year observations. In the later test, as part 
of robustness checks, we use the total number of patent applications and authorizations in each 
province and conduct tests at the provincial level. We use the natural logarithm of the total 
number of patent applications and the natural logarithm of the patents generated (logAPPLY 
and logGRANT) as the main innovation measures in our analysis. To avoid losing observations 
with zero patents, we add one to the actual values when calculating the natural logarithm. 
 
In addition, in the section of robust tests, we redefine APPLY and GRANT as the aggregation 
of the number of patent applications and grants in our samples at the province-year level, and 
we estimate provincial panel data using fixed-effect panel regression. 
 
Measuring bank diversity and control variables 
The main variable of interest in our analysis is the diversity of bank types. To measure bank 
diversity, we construct an index based on the asset of different bank types in a given province. 
For each province-year, we calculate bank diversity through the Herfindahl concentration index 
for bank assets (DIVERSITY). We calculate the Herfindahl index using type categories of 
banks in China: state-owned commercial banks, policy bank, joint-stock commercial bank, city 
commercial bank, rural cooperative financial institution, postal savings bank, new rural 
financial institution, foreign bank and other. The Herfindahl index is equal to the sum of the 
squared asset shares of each type of bank. Then, we use 1 minus the Herfindahl index and get 
the DIVERSITY indicator. We subtract the Herfindahl index because higher values indicate 
higher bank concentration and lower diversity. 
 
In addition, we recalculate bank diversity via the share of bank assets held by the five largest 
banks in each province (CR5) in a robust test. All of the five largest banks are state-owned 
banks with over 40% of the asset share in most provinces. We calculate bank diversity 
(DIVERSITY) using 1 minus CR5 in the robust test. We use 1-year lagged bank diversity to 
analyze the impact on firm innovation. 
 
In our econometric framework, besides the main variables of interest, we need to control for 
explanatory variables varying with firm, province, and year that affect innovation. Following 
the innovation literature (see Aghion et al., 2005; Cornaggia et al., 2015; Acharya and Xu, 
2017), we include the size of the firm (Log SALES), which is the logarithm of lagged sales. 
Our specification also includes asset tangibility (PPE), which is the net property plant and 
equipment divided by total assets. We also include a cash holding scale (CASH), which is total 
cash scaled by total assets. In addition, we control for firm return on assets (ROA), firm 
leverage (LEV), firm age (AGE) and the proportion of the biggest shareholder (OWN1). 
 
We also control for some macroeconomic variables by referring to Morgan et al. (2004), 
Benfratello et al. (2008), and Cornaggia et al. (2015). We control for the natural logarithm of 
provincial GDP per capita (log GDP), total export-import volume divided by GDP (EX-IM), 
and the degree of government intervention using the proportion of the government’s financial 
expenditure on regional GDP (GOVERN). In addition, we compute the province-level labour 
force composition for 19 different industry segments following formal industry classification 
and control for province-level labour force concentration using the the Herfindahl Index 
(LOBCON). Meanwhile, we also compute the province-level industrial share of total value-
added, and control for province-level industrial concentration using the Herfindahl Index 
(VALCON). 
 
Summary of statistics 
Table 1 provides summarized statistics of the variables used in this study. As reported in Table 
1, at the firm-year level, the average number of patent applications is 39, of which 28 are 
granted. Among 142 applications, 105 patents are granted. The mean of log SALES is 20.651 
ranging from 19.03 to 22.55. The mean of ROA is 0.051 ranging between −0.007 and 0.132. 
The average of PPE-to-assets and CASH-to-assets ratios are 20% and 26% respectively. The 
range of firm leverage is from 0.309 to 0.671 with a mean of 0.333. Most firms are more than 
12 years old, and the average proportion of shares held by the biggest shareholder is 35%.  
 
At the province-year level, the average value of DIVERSITY is 0.734. There is a regional 
divergence regarding the level of bank diversity in China, varying from a lower reading 0.654 
(with p5) to a higher value of 0.786 (with p95). An average provincial GDP (PGDP) is 54 
thousand yuan GDP per capita; the difference between the highest province and the lowest 
province reaches 75 thousand yuan. The average number of total export-import volume divided 
by GDP (EX-IM) and the proportion of the government’s financial expenditure on regional 
GDP (GOVERN) is 59% and 17% respectively. Lastly, labour force concentration (LOBCON) 
and industrial concentration value (VALCON) are 18% and 24% respectively. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
 
Our time series data also show that the year average bank diversity, the yearly average 
numbers of firm patent applications and grants from 2007 to 2017 steadily grow in the same 
trend.  
 
 
The impact of bank diversity on firm innovation 
 
 
To assess how banking diversity affects innovation, we estimate the following model: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘 + 𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(1) 
where i indexes firm, t indexes time, j indexes province, and k indexes industry. The dependent 
variables in Eq. (1) are the natural logarithm of the number of patents applied and the natural 
logarithm of the number of patents granted in a firm. We measure the bank diversity variable 
(DIVERSITY) for province j in year t-1. Z is a vector of controls that includes firm-level and 
province-level variables. Industryk and Yeart capture industry and year fixed effects, 
respectively. 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the baseline estimations. Columns (1) and (3) are estimated using 
the OLS estimators with sector and year dummies, and the dependent variables are patent 
applications and patent grants respectively. In relation to the firm-level control variables, the 
results suggest that larger and high-profit companies display higher innovation, however, high 
fixed assets and cash ratio, high financial leverage and high equity concentration companies 
tend to be less innovative. Turning to the province-level control variables, the findings suggest 
that firm innovation is positively associated with the total export-import volume, labour 
concentration and industrial concentration, but negatively associated with provincial GDP per 
capita. 
 
Regarding our variables of interest, the evidence in Table 2 across specifications indicates that 
bank diversity (DIVERSITY) is negatively associated with innovation. In columns 1 and 3, the 
coefficient of DIVERSITY is positive (1.402, t = 2.67 and 1.333, t = 2.56) and statistically 
significant at 1% and 5% level. The finding supports that bank diversity leads to an increase in 
the number of firm patents, both in patent applications and patent grants. 
 
The statistically significant coefficients in columns (1) and (3) do not necessarily imply that 
the observed relationships are also important in economic terms. To assess the economic impact, 
we move a hypothetical firm from a province at the 5th percentile to a province at the 95th 
percentile in the distribution of bank diversity and check how this change affects the number 
of patent grants and patent applications. Based on the coefficient estimate of DIVERSITY in 
columns (1) and (3), the migration of a firm from the 5th to the 95th percentile in the distribution 
of bank diversity results in a total of 18.5% (= (78.6%-65.4%) × 1.402) and 17.6% (= (78.6%-
65.4%) × 1.333) more patent applications and patent grants. The effect of bank diversity on 
patent quantity is large: for example, the average number of patent grants in a firm is 58 in 
2017, and the 17.6% reduction by a drop of 10 patents from the 5th percentile to 95th percentile 
province in 2017. This reduction in patent quantity is also significantly relative to the variability 
of patent grants over time. We make this comparison by taking the average of firm-level patent 
grants in each of the period from 2007 to 2017. The standard deviation of these 11 observations 
is 16 patent grants. Therefore, the comparison shows that the increase in patent quantity as a 
result of bank diversity increase (from the 5th percentile to 95th percentile province) is equal to 
62.5% (= 10/16) of the variability of patent production over time. Our findings are in line with 
the earlier studies (e.g. Chava et al., 2013; Cornaggia et al., 2015) on banking deregulation in 
the US and suggest that banking deregulation in China also shows a decrease in local market 
power for banks and an increase in the level of firm innovation.  
  
In Table 2, we consider the potential endogeneity of firm-level variables that may stem from 
time-invariant confounding factors. To address this, we re-estimate baseline estimations using 
the fixed effect model. The results in columns (2) and (4) of Table 2 suggest that accounting 
for firm-level time-unvarying unobservable heterogeneity does not alter the conclusions of our 
baseline estimate. 
 
 
5. Robustness checks 
In this section, we check the robustness of our main findings. We first examine whether our 
main results are robust to alternative proxies for bank diversity and control variables. Next, we 
use regional panel data to analyze the impact of regional bank diversity on the total numbers 
of innovation in provinces.  
 Alternative proxies for bank diversity, control variables and innovation  
Table 3 re-estimates our baseline estimation using alternative measures of bank diversity, 
control variables and innovation. First, the measure of bank diversity is replaced by calculating 
the share of banking system assets held by the five largest banks in each province (CR5) 
(DIVERSITY = 1- CR5), and columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 report the estimation results. 
Although the coefficient estimation of DIVERSITY in column (1) is not significant, the 
coefficient is still positive. In the meanwhile, the coefficient in column (2) is negative and 
significant at the 10% level, which means the results are basically unaltered.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Further, we aggregate the firm-level controls at the province-industry-year level, as it is 
typically reported in the literature (see Harrison et al., 2014). We thus replace the firm-level 
variables with the average values for the size, performance, fixed asset ratio, cash ratio, share 
concentration and age of firms belonging to the same industry, and columns (3) and (4) of Table 
3 report the estimation results. In columns (3) and (4), we continue observing positive 
coefficient estimates of DIVERSITY that are significant at the 5% level, which means the 
regression results are unaltered. 
 
Provincial panel data analyses 
In the main analysis, we use firm-level samples to analyze the relationship between bank 
diversity and firm innovation. In this section, we check whether our main results are robust 
when we use provincial panel data. To assess how bank diversity affects regional innovation, 
we estimate the following model use province-level samples: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖� = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      (2) 
where j indexes province and t indexes time. The dependent variables of APPLY and GRANT 
are the aggregation of the number of patent applications and grants respectively, in our samples 
at the province-year level. We measure the bank diversity variable, DIVERSITY, using 1-HHI 
and 1-CR5 for province j in year t-1. Z is a vector of controls that includes province-level 
variables. Yeart captures year fixed effects. The province-level sample consists of 304 
province-year observations representing 30 provinces from 2007 to 2017. We report the results 
using provincial panel data in Table 4. 
Insert Table 4 here 
In Table 4, we find that the coefficient estimates of β1 are all positive and significant for 
logAPPLY and logGRANT at 10% or 5% level. The finding supports the conclusion that bank 
diversity leads to an increase in the total numbers of province patent applications and grants, 
which is consistent with our baseline analysis. 
 
Overall, the significant effects of bank diversity on innovation remain after altering proxies for 
bank diversity and control variables, and the level of samples, suggesting that our main findings 
are robust. 
 
 
6. Mechanism tests  
Our evidence so far shows a robust and positive effect of province-level bank diversity on 
innovation by sample firms. In this section, we explore possible underlying mechanisms 
through which bank diversity may affect firm innovation output. These economic mechanisms 
are well-embedded in the literature discussed in the introduction. Specifically, we examine 
whether external finance dependence, growth opportunity, and regional financial development 
are possible underlying economic mechanisms through which bank diversity affects innovation. 
Insert Table 5 here 
External finance dependence 
In this subsection, we examine how bank diversity affects innovation through the first 
economic mechanism proposed: external finance dependence. The literature agrees that bank 
diversity is conducive to increasing bank competition and reducing financing constraints for 
firms’ innovation. Compared with other financing channels, firms that are dependent on 
external finance are more likely to apply for bank credit (Xin et al., 2017). If the banking market 
structure directly affects the firms’ access to credit, their innovation activities would be 
consequently affected. Therefore, firms that are external-finance-dependent should be affected 
more by the banking market structure than their counterparts. As such, we expect external-
finance-dependent firms would increase in innovation outputs when bank diversity increases. 
 
Using the measure of external finance dependence developed by Duchin et al. (2010), we 
construct a variable (External Finance Dependence), which is calculated as (Capital 
Expenditures - Funds from Operations)/ (Capital Expenditures). We then construct a dummy 
variable, DEPENDENCE, which equals one for firm-years above the industry median External 
Finance Dependence value (i.e. more external-finance-dependent) and zero for firm-years 
below the industry median EXTERNAL FINANCE DEPENDENCE value (i.e. less external-
finance dependent). To examine how firm external finance dependence alters the marginal 
impact of banking diversity on its innovation, we estimate the following regress model: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)= 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1+ 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘 + 𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(3) 
where i indexes firm, t indexes time, j indexes province, and k indexes industry. The coefficient 
on the interaction term, β3, reflects the different effects of bank diversity on innovation for 
firms that are more external-finance-dependent. We expect β3 to be positive and significant. 
 
We report the results estimating Eq. (3) in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5. The coefficient 
estimates of DIVERSITY are positive but insignificant, suggesting that an increase in bank 
diversity does not appear to affect innovation for firms that are less dependent on external 
finance. The coefficient estimates of the interaction term (DIVERSITY× DEPENDENCE) are 
positive in both specifications and significant at the 5% level (1.597, t= 2.35 and 1.456, t= 
2.16). Based on the coefficient estimate of the interaction term reported in columns (1) and (2), 
the marginal effect of DIVERSITY for more external-finance-dependent firms are 2.254 
(0.675+ 1.579) and 2.127 (0.671+ 1.456), which means more external-finance-dependent firms 
located in the most concentrated province (95th percentile in the distribution of bank diversity) 
have a total of 29.8% (= (78.6%- 65.4%) × 2.254) more applications and a total of 28.1% (= 
(78.6%- 65.4%) × 2.127) more granted patents than firms in the least concentrated province 
(5th percentile in the distribution of bank diversity). These findings suggest that bank diversity 
enhances innovation output for more external-finance-dependent firms, leading these firms to 
apply and be granted more patents, in high bank diversity regions. The result is in line with that 
in Cornaggia et al. (2015), i.e. innovation with firms that are dependent on external finance 
receive more benefits from banking deregulation.  
 
Growth opportunities 
Next, we examine whether firm growth opportunities interact with the changes in bank 
diversity to affect their innovation output. We expect that higher bank diversity would 
encourage firms investing in innovation because firms’ innovation projects can be evaluated 
by different methods of value assessment used by diversified banks. On the other hand, if a 
firm has more growth opportunities and innovative projects, banks might take it into account 
when evaluating their innovation projects, i.e. evaluating a whole picture of growth opportunity 
rather than assessing all individual projects in detail, as banks believe that even if some of the 
projects do not succeed, other successful projects can offset the loss. As such, lending to 
innovative firms with more growth opportunities is less likely cause bad debt issues. This 
hypothesis suggests firm growth opportunity is a substitution mechanism to diversified lending 
technologies in financing innovation. Therefore, we expect that firms with more growth 
opportunities should have less increase in innovation output after bank diversity increases. 
 
By referring Cornaggia et al. (2015), we use Tobin’s Q as a proxy variable for firm growth 
opportunities, which is firms’ market-to-book ratio and calculated as (market value of equity + 
book value of assets - book value of equity)/ (book value of assets). And then, we construct a 
dummy variable, OPPORTUNITY, which equals one for firm-years above the industry median 
Tobin’s Q value (i.e., more growth opportunities) and zero for firm-years below the industry 
median Tobins Q value (i.e., fewer growth opportunities). To examine how firm growth 
opportunity alters the marginal impact of bank diversity on its innovation, we estimate the 
following regress model: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙RANT 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)= 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1+ 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−1 × 𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘 + 𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(4) 
where i indexes firm, t indexes time, j indexes province, and k indexes industry. The coefficient 
on the interaction term, β3 reflects the different effects of bank diversity on innovation for firms 
with more growth opportunities. We expect β3 to be negative and significant. 
 
We report the regression results in estimating Eq. (4) in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5. The 
coefficient estimates of DIVERSITY are positive in both specifications and significant at the 
1% level (2.065, t = 3.54 and 1.988, t = 3.43), which suggests that bank diversity has a positive 
effect on innovation output by firms with fewer growth opportunities. The coefficient estimate 
of the interaction term (DIVERSITY × OPPORTUNITY) in columns (3) and (4) are negative 
and significant at the 1% or 5% level (-1.817, t = -2.61 and -1.777, t= -2.57), which means that 
firms with more growth opportunities are less affected by bank diversity in terms of innovation. 
Further, the marginal effect of DIVERSITY for firms with more growth opportunities is 0.248 
(2.065 - 1.817) and 0.211 (1.988- 1.777), and the joint test of β1+β3 is insignificant (F= 0.13 
and 0.10). The evidence suggests that although bank diversity positively affects SMEs’ 
innovation in general, this effect mainly comes from the group of firms with fewer growth 
opportunities. For firms with more growth opportunities, bank diversity does not affect their 
innovation outputs. Our results parallel those from a large sample of 118,000 SMEs across 20 
European countries conducted by Ryan et al. (2014), as their findings conclude that increased 
market power leads increasing firms’ financing constraints, and in turn, decreasing innovation 
outputs.   
 
Regional financial development 
In this subsection, we examine how bank diversity affects innovation through the last economic 
mechanism proposed: regional financial development. Firms with innovation projects are often 
in the position of lack of capital as financing innovation tends to be difficult because of the 
uncertainty and information asymmetry associated (Acharya and Xu, 2017). As mentioned 
earlier, in a diversified banking system, firms’ innovative projects can be evaluated by lenders 
from different backgrounds. This is an important mechanism and an effective way of solving 
information asymmetry problems. Similarly, one of the important functions of financial market 
development in a region is to overcome adverse selection and the moral hazard so that the 
opportunity of firms’ access to external capital can be increased (Hsu et al., 2014). In other 
words, if firms are established in a region with a high level of financial development, it should 
be easier for them to get external finance to meet their innovation expenditure. That means 
regional financial development is a substitution mechanism to bank diversity in solving the 
problem of information asymmetry. Therefore, we expect that firms established in the 
provinces with a high level of financial development should perform less in innovation output 
after bank diversity increases. 
 
Using the measure of regional financial development developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
we construct a variable (Financial Development), which is calculated as (Stock Market 
Capitalization + Bank Credit)/ (Gross Domestic Product (GDP)). And then, we construct a 
dummy variable (DEVELOP), which equals one for firms in the province above the median 
Financial Development value (i.e., high regional financial development) and zero for firms in 
the province below the median external finance dependence value (i.e., low regional financial 
development). We estimate the following regress model: 
log𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙RANT 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)= 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1+ 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘 + 𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(5) 
Where i indexes firm, t indexes time, j indexes province, and k indexes industry. The coefficient 
on the interaction term, β3 reflects the different effects of bank diversity on innovation for firms 
that in the regions with high financial development. We expect β3 to be negative and significant. 
 
We report the regression results in estimating Eq. (5) in columns (5) and (6) of Table 5. The 
coefficient estimates of DIVERSITY are positive in both specifications and significant at the 
1% level (1.747, t = 3.13 and, 1.619, t = 2.93), which suggests that bank diversity has a positive 
effect on innovation outputs for firms in provinces with low financial development. The 
coefficient estimate of the interaction term (DIVERSITY× DEVELOPMENT) in columns (5) 
and (6) are negative and significant at the 5% level (-2.317, t = -2.44 and -2.627, t = -2.79), 
which means that firms in the provinces with high financial development are less affected by 
bank diversity on innovation. Further, the marginal effects of DIVERSITY for firms in the 
provinces with high financial development are -0.57 (1.747- 2.317) and -1.008 (1.619- 2.627), 
and the joint test of β1+β3 are insignificant (F= 0.36 and 1.13). The evidence suggests that 
although bank diversity positively affects firms’ innovation on average, this effect mainly 
comes from the group of firms that are established in the provinces with a low level of financial 
development. For firms that are established in high financial development regions, bank 
diversity does not affect their innovation outputs significantly. Therefore, this line of our 
evidence echoes the argument proposed by Hsu et al. (2014, p.117) that “equity markets and 
credit markets could play different roles in determining financing cost and, ultimately, 
influencing innovation” and their finding that firms being more dependent on external finance 
and more high-tech intensifying can perform better in countries with better-developed equity 
markets rather than credit markets.  
 
 
7. Concluding remarks  
Contributions and implication 
Motivated by recent Chinese banking market changes from deregulation and more firms 
engaging in innovation in China, this paper aims to advance our understanding around the 
relationship between bank diversity and firm innovation as a result of recent bank deregulation 
from 2003. We have made contributions to the existing body of literature in three ways: 
Research about the impacts of bank deregulation on firm innovation is heavily concentrated in 
the US context, based on intrastate and interstate bank deregulation in the last century, and little 
has been done in other countries with significantly different banking systems and institutional 
environments. To the best of our knowledge, this paper has filled a gap by shedding light on 
the issue of how bank diversity in China affected firm innovation after bank deregulation began 
in 2003. Despite this, the Chinese banking system has a number of discrepancies with American 
one which have attracted significant attention in the literature. Our findings have confirmed an 
observation that firms engaged in more innovation activities in bank diversified regions, which 
means banking deregulation is conducive to SME innovation in China. The findings support 
the results in Chava et al. (2013), Amore et al. (2013) and Cornaggia et al. (2015) relating to 
interstate deregulation. The results prove and confirm that Chinese banking deregulation has 
achieved a landmark as a catch-up step. From this perspective, our finding should have a 
meaningful policy implication to encourage Chinese banking reform authorities carrying on 
bank market reform and deregulation, in order for innotative firms to receive more benefits 
from bank diversity.         
 
From further testing three possible mechanisms (i.e. external finance dependence, firms’ 
growth opportunities and regional financial development) through which bank diversity could 
convert firms’ innovation performance, following the approach used in Duchin et al. (2010), 
Cornaggia et al. (2015), Ryan et al. (2014), Hsu et al. (2014), and Acharya and Xu (2017), we 
have found fresh evidence to support these studies in a different country (Chinese context). 
These findings include: (1) bank diversity plays a more important role for external-finance-
dependent firms than others;  (2) a positive impact of bank diversity on innovative outputs has 
been found for the firms having fewer growth opportunities; (3) the overall positive effects of 
bank diversity on innovation are particularly strong among firms established in the provinces 
with a low level of financial market development. Our results highlight that firm characteristics 
(e.g. external finance dependence and growth opportunities) and financial development are 
among the factors that affect the relationship between bank diversity and firm innovation. We 
have discussed the linkage between our findings and those in well-cited studies. These findings 
suggest that China’s central and local governments and banking authorities need to review and 
assess relevant policies more broadly and in details to tackle the imbalance in relation to 
firms’financing, growth opportunities and regional financial development.  
 
Although our findings provide support to market power theory, arguing that greater competition 
decreases the bank market power and alleviate firm financing constraints for innovative 
projects (Beck et al., 2004), rather than information theory suggesting that bank concentration 
would be beneficial to building firm-bank relationships and reducing firm financing constraints 
for innovative activities (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006), we have provided an alternative 
explanation in the theoretical background section to argue that bank diversity is conducive to 
shaping incentives of firms to pursue innovative projects regardless of whether a market power 
theory or information theory viewpoint is adopted. However, this could be a future research 
direction using proper measures to prove it.  
 
 
Limitations and future research direction  
We recognise that our research is subject to some limitations and the top two relate to sample 
and measurement. Considering the data availabilities, our sample only includes listed SMEs 
that are the upper end of this group, therefore caution should be taken when generalising the 
results to non-listed SME firms. Another limitation is that we can only use patent application 
and granted numbers as the proxy of firm innovation because we are unable to identify the 
categories of firm innovative projects. Otherwise, a more interesting analysis could be carried 
out to find what types of innovation projects attract bank financing. This could be one of the 
future research directions as well.  
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Tables 
 
Table1 Summary of statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Median p5 p25 p75 p95 
APPLY 8143 39.246 15 0 4 38 142 
GRANT 8143 28.275 10 0 2 28 105 
Log APPLY 8143 2.589 2.773 0 1.609 3.663 4.962 
Log GRANT 8143 2.290 2.398 0 1.098 3.367 4.663 
DIVERSITY 8143 0.734 0.739 0.654 0.710 0.768 0.786 
log SALES 8143 20.651 20.570 19.030 19.869 21.321 22.552 
ROA 8143 0.051 0.050 -0.007 0.025 0.076 0.132 
PPE 8143 0.202 0.179 0.022 0.096 0.286 0.463 
CASH 8143 0.259 0.204 0.054 0.118 0.358 0.636 
LEV 8143 0.333 0.309 0.068 0.178 0.467 0.671 
AGE 8143 12.495 12 5 9 15 21 
OWN1 8143 0.350 0.334 0.147 0.236 0.443 0.612 
PGDP 8143 10.904 10.982 10.104 10.624 11.212 11.513 
EX&IM 8143 0.590 0.534 0.070 0.241 0.956 1.291 
GOVERN 8143 0.167 0.148 0.105 0.126 0.204 0.250 
LOBCON 8143 0.180 0.198 0.076 0.126 0.221 0.286 
VALCON 8143 0.239 0.237 0.194 0.227 0.256 0.277 
 
 
  
Table 2 Baseline estimates of the impact of bank diversity on firm innovation 
 log APPLY log GRANT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS FE OLS FE 
DIVERSITY 1.402 0.977 1.333 0.728 
 (2.67)*** (2.25)** (2.56)** (1.66)* 
log SALES 0.393 0.463 0.354 0.378 
 (21.59)*** (16.57)*** (19.62)*** (13.39)*** 
ROA 0.909 0.164 0.821 0.311 
 (3.71)*** (0.88) (3.38)*** (1.66)* 
PPE -1.311 0.302 -1.250 0.275 
 (-9.89)*** (2.06)** (-9.50)*** (1.85)* 
CASH -0.197 0.0580 -0.191 0.168 
 (-1.70)* (0.57) (-1.66)* (1.65)* 
LEV -0.169 -0.360 0.0000216 -0.262 
 (-1.47) (-3.08)*** (0.00) (-2.22)** 
AGE -0.00604 0.0666 -0.00963 0.0270 
 (-1.81)* (2.45)** (-2.91)*** (0.99) 
OWN1 -0.390 -0.0603 -0.278 -0.124 
 (-3.73)*** (-0.32) (-2.68)*** (-0.64) 
log GDP -0.412 0.284 -0.499 0.291 
 (-5.61)*** (1.47) (-6.87)*** (1.49) 
EX&IM 0.505 0.0758 0.498 0.250 
 (7.26)*** (0.48) (7.22)*** (1.57) 
GOVERN -0.652 0.793 -1.178 1.323 
 (-1.43) (0.78) (-2.59)*** (1.28) 
LABCON 1.261 0.326 1.566 0.476 
 (3.41)*** (0.63) (4.26)*** (0.90) 
VALCON 5.600 1.232 5.378 0.887 
 (6.68)*** (1.32) (6.47)*** (0.94) 
Sector dummies Yes no yes no 
Year dummies Yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect No yes no yes 
N 8143 8143 8143 8143 
R2 0.285 0.226 0.258 0.134 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Table 3 Robustness check using an alternative measure of variables 
 DIVERSITY = 1- CR5 Aggregation of firm-level controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log APPLY Log GRANT Log APPLY Log GRANT 
DIVERSITY 0.223 0.753 1.202 1.088 
 (0.55) (1.85)* (2.18)** (2.00)** 
ln SALES 0.393 0.355 0.230 0.203 
 (21.59)*** (19.65)*** (4.81)*** (4.30)*** 
ROA 0.916 0.820 0.149 0.481 
 (3.74)*** (3.37)*** (0.20) (0.66) 
PPE -1.304 -1.244 -0.624 -0.303 
 (-9.83)*** (-9.46)*** (-1.95)* (-0.96) 
CASH -0.187 -0.182 -0.290 -0.136 
 (-1.62) (-1.58) (-0.94) (-0.45) 
LEV -0.167 0.000342 -0.865 -0.733 
 (-1.46) (0.00) (-2.78)*** (-2.39)** 
AGE -0.00575 -0.00965 0.000298 -0.00316 
 (-1.72)* (-2.92)*** (0.03) (-0.36) 
OWN1 -0.389 -0.276 -1.164 -1.076 
 (-3.72)*** (-2.66)*** (-4.14)*** (-3.88)*** 
log GDP -0.367 -0.483 -0.321 -0.407 
 (-5.03)*** (-6.67)*** (-4.14)*** (-5.33)*** 
EX&IM 0.447 0.478 0.465 0.457 
 (6.43)*** (6.94)*** (6.17)*** (6.13)*** 
GOVERN -0.603 -1.188 -0.0109 -0.501 
 (-1.31) (-2.61)*** (-0.02) (-1.05) 
LABCON 0.989 1.244 1.736 2.034 
 (2.73)*** (3.47)*** (4.35)*** (5.16)*** 
GDPCON 5.825 5.662 6.325 6.150 
 (6.96)*** (6.82)*** (7.14)*** (7.03)*** 
Sector dummies yes no yes no 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
N 8143 8143 8143 8143 
R2 0.284 0.258 0.221 0.199 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
Table 4 Provincial panel data analysis 
 DIVERSITY = 1- HHI DIVERSITY = 1- CR5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log APPLY Log GRANT Log APPLY Log GRANT 
DIVERSITY 2.662 2.789 3.298 3.174 
 (1.67)* (1.73)* (2.05)** (1.94)* 
log GDP -1.769 -1.995 -1.994 -2.194 
 (-3.46)*** (-3.84)*** (-3.70)*** (-4.01)*** 
EX&IM 0.824 0.950 0.851 0.965 
 (1.31) (1.49) (1.36) (1.52) 
GOVERN 0.121 -0.475 -0.477 -0.935 
 (0.05) (-0.19) (-0.19) (-0.36) 
LABCON -1.563 -2.106 -0.276 -0.811 
 (-0.51) (-0.68) (-0.09) (-0.26) 
GDPCON 10.92 11.03 11.18 11.24 
 (4.51)*** (4.49)*** (4.61)*** (4.56)*** 
Province 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
N 304 304 304 304 
R2 0.853 0.827 0.854 0.827 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5 mechanism tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 logAPPLY logGRAN
T 
logAPPL
Y 
logGRAN
T 
logAPPL
Y 
logGRA
NT 
DIVERSITY 0.675 0.671 2.065 1.988 1.747 1.619 
 (1.12) (1.12) (3.54)*** (3.43)*** (3.13)*** (2.93)*** 
DEPENDENCE -1.040 -0.953     
 (-2.08)*** (-1.92)*     
DIVERSITY x 
DEPENDENCE 
 
1.597 1.456     
(2.35)** (2.16)**     
OPPORTUNITY   1.332 1.279   
   (2.61)*** (2.52)***   
DIVERSITY x 
OPPORTUNITY 
 
  -1.817 -1.777   
  (-2.61)*** (-2.57)**   
DEVELOP     1.725 1.998 
     (2.46)** (2.87)*** 
DIVERSITY x 
DEVELOP 
 
    -2.317 -2.627 
    (-2.44)** (-
2.79)*** 
ln SALES 0.399 0.359 0.391 0.349 0.392 0.353 
 (21.86)*** (19.85)*** (20.72)*** (18.63)*** (21.53)*** (19.50)**
* 
ROA 0.983 0.887 0.911 0.850 0.906 0.817 
 (4.01)*** (3.65)*** (3.68)*** (3.46)*** (3.70)*** (3.36)*** 
PPE -1.261 -1.206 -1.310 -1.251 -1.313 -1.252 
 (-9.46)*** (-9.12)*** (-9.88)*** (-9.51)*** (-9.91)*** (-
9.52)*** 
CASH -0.173 -0.170 -0.202 -0.190 -0.199 -0.187 
 (-1.49) (-1.48) (-1.74)* (-1.65)* (-1.72)* (-1.63) 
LEV -0.208 -0.0344 -0.169 -0.00370 -0.169 0.00434 
 (-1.81)* (-0.30) (-1.47) (-0.03) (-1.47) (0.04) 
AGE -0.00561 -0.00926 -0.00593 -0.00956 -0.00575 -0.00930 
 (-1.69)* (-2.80)*** (-1.78)* (-2.89)*** (-1.72)* (-
2.81)*** 
OWN1 -0.386 -0.275 -0.385 -0.267 -0.383 -0.266 
 (-3.70)*** (-2.65)*** (-3.67)*** (-2.56)** (-3.67)*** (-2.56)** 
36 
 
log GDP -0.412 -0.500 -0.405 -0.494 -0.409 -0.528 
 (-5.63)*** (-6.88)*** (-5.53)*** (-6.79)*** (-5.16)*** (-
6.71)*** 
EX&IM 0.499 0.493 0.498 0.494 0.513 0.507 
 (7.19)*** (7.15)*** (7.15)*** (7.15)*** (7.38)*** (7.35)*** 
GOVERN -0.566 -1.102 -0.613 -1.143 -0.502 -1.172 
 (-1.24) (-2.43)** (-1.34) (-2.52)** (-1.02) (-2.40)** 
LABCON 1.281 1.583 1.291 1.589 1.351 1.634 
 (3.46)*** (4.31)*** (3.48)*** (4.32)*** (3.61)*** (4.41)*** 
GDPCON 5.626 5.403 5.616 5.388 6.103 6.130 
 (6.72)*** (6.50)*** (6.70)*** (6.48)*** (6.98)*** (7.07)*** 
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes Yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes Yes yes 
N 7590 7590 7759 7759 8143 8143 
R2 0.283 0.259 0.286 0.256 0.286 0.259 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
